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Goldilocks Apologizes
Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States.
By Davis H. Bayley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
Pp. xvi, 201. 510.95.
Reviewed by Gary T. Marxt
Japan presents a fascinating anomaly to the American interested in
questions of police and crime. It has undergone rapid social change.
It is a heavily industrialized, urbanized, densely populated society with
violence in its history and traditions. As such we might expect it to be
similar to the United States with respect to questions of crime and
police. Yet the crime rate is exceptionally low, police ethics and job
satisfaction are high, and there is a remarkable degree of civility in
police-citizen encounters. David Bayley seeks to describe this situation
and to speculate on what produces it.'
Students of comparative culture often point out the many difficulties
specialists face in studying someone else's society. How much greater
the difficulties must be if one does not speak the language, is not an
expert on the region, has a mere two summers in which to carry out
field work, and is studying a sensitive institution that specializes in
secrecy (and one that often has a lot to hide). Given such factors, David
Bayley's unpretentious little book is impressive. My skepticism on
methodological grounds is more than balanced by an appreciation of
the interesting descriptive material offered, the integration and but-
tressing of Bayley's own firsthand observations with English language
secondary sources, and the author's willingness to venture into largely
uncharted waters.
Bayley observed a wide variety of police operations and carried out
"hundreds" of interviews through an interpreter. He brought to his
t Professor of Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Marx
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task prior research experience on the police in India and the United
States.2 The focus is on patrolmen and police-citizen relations, rather
than on detectives or police relations with courts, prisons, or other
elements of the criminal justice system. Chapters deal with police-
citizen interaction and a patrolman's life, discipline and responsibility,
community relations, victimless crime, deviance and authority, vio-
lence, and the police as an institution. No compelling rationale is
offered for the way the book unfolds and the topics it covers and ex-
cludes. This, however, is a pedantic drawback. As the only serious
study of any breadth on the contemporary Japanese police, Bayley's
book is very welcome. It is a useful addition to the limited, and sur-
prisingly not growing, English literature on contemporary police in
industrial societies other than the United States and England.
Bayley's major concern is to examine the ways in which social con-
text shapes police institutions. Recognizing that police reflect the
society of which they are a part, he holds out little hope for improving
American police by importing Japanese administrative practices. Yet
his analysis of the Japanese police makes us more aware of what we
are and the broad directions toward which we might aim in the future.
Bayley offers major contrasts between the United States and Japan
with respect to crime patterns, the reaction of citizens to authority, the
nature of the police role, means of obtaining accountability, and
police-citizen relations. I shall consider each of these briefly in turn.
In Bayley's words, there is a "qualitative difference in civility" be-
tween Japan and the United States.3 Japan has less than half the popu-
lation of the United States; yet in 1973 only 1,876 robberies were
known to the police in Japan, while in the United States the com-
parable figure was 382,680.4 In addition, the incidence of reported
crime per person in Japan in 1973 was only about one-half that in
1946, while by most measures traditional crimes increased consider-
ably in the United States during that period.5
Weapons do not complicate the task of the Japanese police: for
practical purposes Japan is a disarmed society. Ownership of weapons
has been severely limited for at least 400 years, and even the samurai
have been disarmed for 100 years. Firearms, swords, and even knives
2. D. BAYLEY, THE POLICE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA (1964); D. BAYLEY &
H. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE (1969).
3. P. 9.
4. P. 6. Tokyo had 361, while New York City, with a comparable population, had
74, 381. Id. Differences are probably even more pronounced, since rates of underreport-
ing appear to be higher in the United States. P. 7.
5. P. 7.
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must be registered. Handguns are not permitted in private hands.
Compared to the United States, there are few rifles and shotguns
(about 650,000 versus at least 75 million).
Predictably, then, firearms are not a serious factor in Japanese crime.
For example, handguns were used in only 16 of the 80,000 serious of-
fenses committed in Tokyo in 1971. In the United States, by contrast,
65% of all murders, 25% of all aggravated assaults, and 41% of all
robberies involve firearms. In Japan detectives and police off duty or
on traffic duty do not carry weapons. Fewer than five Japanese officers
a year are killed nonaccidentally and these deaths are rarely the
product of firearms. In the United States more than 100 officers a year
are killed, three-quarters of the time by firearms."
Homicide rates partly reflect the high level of disarmament in
Japan. The Japanese homicide rate is 1.9 per 100,000 population; for
the United States it is 9.3. The New York metropolitan area, with a
population of almost 12 million, had 1,739 murders in 1973, while
Tokyo, with a comparable population, had 196.s
Nor are drugs a problem in Japan. In Tokyo about 30 persons a year
are arrested for offenses involving hard drugs. In New York City
23,000 arrests were made in 1972 for sale and possession. According
to Bayley, Japanese narcotics addiction and drug abuse are declining.
One-quarter as many violations of drug laws were reported in 1973 as
in 1959.9
Even when a crime is committed and the perpetrator apprehended
the dynamics differ widely from those in the United States. In his
chapter on "The Individual and Authority," which I found the most
interesting, Bayley considers some of the reasons for the lower Japa-
nese crime rate. In Japan an individual's sense of well-being depends
to a much greater extent on group acceptance than in the United
States. Japanese are less combative and manifest more submissive at-
titudes toward authority. Offenders are expected to show contrition
and accept responsibility for their wrongdoing (the suspect is to act
"'like a carp on the cutting board' "), and citizens feel a strong obliga-
tion to assist in preserving moral consensus in the community.'0 In
return, authorities are expected to show benevolence, discretion is
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often informal. Bayley argues that "a Japanese accepts the authority
of law as he would the customs of his family.""
Folk tales nicely capture the role of apology, repentence, and the
Japanese belief that bad character can always be changed. In the
American version of the child's tale, Goldilocks runs away. In the
Japanese version the story ends with Goldilocks apologizing for her
misbehavior and the bears then inviting her back. Similarly, in the
Japanese version, when the wicked wolf in Little Red Riding Hood is
confronted by the hunter, he falls to his knees, begs forgiveness, and
promises not to do it again.1
2
If Japanese police in general face a respectful and law-abiding
public, Japanese citizens reciprocally face a seemingly well-behaved
and content police force. Patrolmen are more self-effacing and do not
swagger or exchange hostile stares with youth and street elements.' 3
As Michael Banton has noted with respect to the police in England,
because their authority is less often challenged, police are not always
on the verge of asserting it.'- Policemen in public places are in-
conspicuous. A tradition exists of avoiding eye contact and preserving
privacy in public. Police "see but they rarely take notice."'1
In Japan police are moral as well as legal actors and, like police in
England, are oriented toward teaching and guiding the community
with respect to correct behavior. The roots of this orientation were in
the Meiji Restoration and the Allied Occupation, the two major
formative periods for the Japanese police. During the former, the
police, along with the schools, courts, and military, were used to move
Japan from a feudal to a modern nation. During the Occupation
police were one of several demonstration projects in democracy."6
In contrast, the American police institution took on modern form
in the 19th century to deal with the quite specific "problems" of riots,
drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution, which were associated with
urbanization, industrialization, and rapid immigration. Teachers and
politicians might offer instruction in civic lessons; police were to
avoid politics and enforce the law. They were to be bureaucratic and
legal, rather than moral, actors. True to their respective heritages,
American police today tend merely to seek compliance with the law,
11. P. 156.
12. P. 140 (citing Lanham & Shimura, Folktales Commonly Told American and
Japanese Children: Ethical Themes of Omission and Commission, J. ANI. FOLKLORE, Jan.-
Mar. 1967, at 33-48).
13. P. 44.
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while the Japanese go beyond this to seek acceptance of the com-
munity's moral values.
This is not to deny that Japanese police have a distinct occupa-
tional culture and a cultivated sense of apartness. But they are not
angry, defensive, or frustrated, and they do not feel victimized and
unappreciated.' 7 In the United States efforts to curb prostitution,
homosexuality, gambling, and drunkenness breed police demoraliza-
tion and corruption, ineffective enforcement, entrapment, and com-
munity conflict. In Japan these activities are not seen as problems of
morality or law enforcement as long as they are carried on discreetly.
Japanese police see their political environment as benign and their
public as supportive. They are critical of neither the courts nor their
supervisors. Police strikes or slowdowns are unknown.18 Indeed, as
part of maintaining their image as dedicated public servants, few
officers even take the full 20 days of paid holidays to which they are
entitled.' 0
The major police discipline problems involve off-duty, rather than
on-duty, behavior. Involvement in a traffic accident, loss of the police
handbook, and improper drinking behavior are the most frequent
offenses.2 0 In 1972, 45 of Japan's 182,000 officers were discharged, and
542 faced departmental punishments.2 ' By contrast, New York City,
with 35,000 officers, gave such punishments to 216.22 The number of
complaints brought to the Japanese equivalent of a civilian review
board (the Human Rights Bureau of the Ministry of Justice) has been
steadily declining.23
Bayley explains the different rates of police misconduct partly by
reference to such Japanese administrative practices as lateral entry,
longer and probably better training, closer internal supervision,
periodic rotation of supervising personnel, and more favorable pros-
pects for career advancement.24 Other factors relate to the police of-
ficer's intense identification with the work group. This results in a
strong motivation not to offend it, or bring dishonor upon it. Dis-
cipline is self-imposed, emerging much more from the dynamics of
17. P.4.
18. Id.





24. Pp. 54-71. A larger proportion of Japanese police are promoted, and the command
structure is more differentiated.
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group membership than from external formal organizational factors
as in the United States. Bayley notes:
American policemen too are conscious of belonging to a distinct
group. But there is a crucial difference. The Japanese police
community has been deliberately created; identity, entailing dis-
tance from others, has been fashioned in order to augment pride.
Community spirit is fostered to facilitate the carrying out of
organization tasks. In the United States, identity is a consequence
of perceived resentment and antagonism. It is founded on rejec-
tion. American policemen have been driven inward against their
will; their communitarian spirit is defensive, like that of a per-
secuted minority group.2
In the United States, police accountability to nonpolice institutions
is given higher priority than developing police initiative. This
American reliance on external checks may impede the development of
the group pride that could provide the basis for self-discipline. It
communicates to the officer the idea that he is not trusted and thus
may lower his sense of self-worth. External discipline too easily can
be seen as an attack upon the entire occupational group. Bayley even
asks "whether so great a reliance on external checks in the United
States is not in some measure responsible for the disciplinary problems
so often deplored."
26
This suggestion raises the ghost of the American police profes-
sionalism model advocated by such police officials as O.V. Wilson
and William Parker. They saw the need for massive changes within
policing, but unlike their liberal critics, they felt that such changes
could only come about internally. Self-control was seen as the best
form of control. Careful selection and inculcation of a strong sense of
duty and pride in occupation were considered the best means for ob-
taining responsible police behavior. Yet there are dangers of police
becoming too isolated and self-protective when exclusive reliance is
placed on internal controls. A balance is obviously needed.
Bayley suggests that the Japanese have been rather more successful
in providing external accountability than the Americans have been in
creating internal responsibility. Following the war the Japanese added
external checks to a "pridefully cohesive police force," apparently
with positive results. Yet equivalent efforts in the United States may
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efforts at external control may have made police more defensive and
lowered their self-esteem. Public criticism acts further to decrease
responsible police behavior, which then triggers another round of
public criticism.
2 7
The product of all these contrasts, especially that of the organiza-
tion, style, and ethics of police work, is a rather remarkable difference
in the character of police-community relations. Unlike the United
States, Japan has one national police force, standardized in its opera-
tions. But command operations are decentralized among 46 prefec-
tures, and most police work out of neighborhood offices called "ko-
bans," which are continuously manned with four to twelve people
per shift.28 Tokyo has approximately 1000 kobans. The average area
covered is .22 square miles with a population of 11,500.29 Police are
literally around the corner.
The koban is a place where people may come to unload their
burdens and seek help, regardless of whether or not a law violation
has occurred. Kobans are accessible and seemingly not very bureau-
cratic. Japanese patrolmen are said to cultivate one ability above all
others: "the art of patient listening." They do not downgrade or resist
non-law enforcement activities the way American police often do.
Typical activities include giving directions and medication, explain-
ing the law, loaning money to help people get home, finding late
night accommodations for those unfamiliar with an area, and dealing
with minor crimes.30 Two examples Bayley cites of koban aid are
providing distilled water (more healthy than tap water) to two small
boys for a just-purchased goldfish in a plastic bag, and lending a pair
of needle-nosed pliers to a middle-aged man whose fly zipper would
not close.3 '
A major function of the koban is to provide information about
house locations. Most smaller streets are unnamed, and since houses
are numbered according to the order in which they were built, those
built at the same time may well have the same number. Kobans obtain
information in a semiannual police "residential survey." This makes
it possible for police to "provide directions in an instant to almost
every person or business in the area. ' 32 It also potentially provides the
27. P. 82.
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government with intelligence on its citizens, though this is an example
of the kind of issue that Bayley consistently ignores.
Because of the kobans and footpatrols, police presence in Japan is
more pervasive than in the United States. Yet it also seems less au-
thoritative, lower key, and less formal. Patrolmen are much more likely
to be personally known in the neighborhood in which they walk and
work than are their American counterparts, enshrouded in their patrol
cars. (Only one-sixth of Japanese patrolmen are assigned to patrol
cars.) Bayley notes:
An American policeman is like a fireman, he responds when he
must. A Japanese policeman is more like a postman, he has a daily
round of low-key activities that relate him to the lives of the people
among whom he works. 33
In Japan there is more sharing of policing tasks by citizens, and the
boundary between police and citizen is more permeable and vague.
Every neighborhood has a crime prevention association made up of
volunteers who work in close coordination with police. There are also
8,000 crime prevention associations organized around occupations and
work places.34 As a result of this cooperation "both policeman and
citizen are responsible for law enforcement and both policeman and
citizen are moral actors."
35
Americans generally tend to take a more individualized approach
to questions of public safety, arming themselves or buying security
devices rather than forming police auxiliaries. This grows out of the
early American concern with specifying and limiting the role of
government. 36 The creation of American police with powers and
duties in principle carefully circumscribed by law serves to curtail
citizen involvement, as well as to limit the range of police activities.
Even when the police and citizenry of Japan conflict, their unique
relationship is evident. Mass confrontations such as those seen in the
United States during the 1960s have been a common feature of
Japanese life for some time.37 Through a process of mutual accom-
modation, police and demonstrators have evolved tactics that make the
loss of human life very unlikely. The fascinating, ritualized character
of Japanese police-demonstrator confrontations indicates that group
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technologies become available, and that crowd behavior, rather than
being normless and formless, may be very much bounded by shared
understanding among participants. Both police and demonstrators
implicitly agree not to use firearms and explosives, thus minimizing
serious injuries.
Like the French Compagnies Republicaines de Securite (C.R.S.),
the Japanese have a special elite riot police, the "Kidotai." They show
considerable restraint and patience in the face of mass confrontations.
Carefully chosen, trained, and supervised, they always act as a group.
On riot duty they are unarmed. The use of guns is seen as unfair and
even cowardly. Much emphasis is put on physical conditioning and on
the hand-to-hand combat thought to characterize the fighting of real
men. Leaders work hard to instill pride and spirit, developing "poise
under stress" rather than fierceness. The avoidance of injury on both
sides is a prime injunction for police.
38
The response of the Japanese police to riots through the use of in-
genious formations illustrates their emphasis on tactics rather than on
hardware. By contrast, Bayley argues, in the United States available
technology tends to determine tactics. For American police the search
for solutions begins rather than ends with examination of equip-
ment.30 Bayley sees American police as more ready to adapt exclu-
sively technological solutions to human problems. The Japanese have
resisted the economies offered by the patrol car and have opted to
continue the neighborhood-centered beat patrolmen, just as they have
resisted weapons in dealing with crowds. While American technical
"solutions" may sometimes be more "efficient," they often bear heavy
social costs such as isolation of police from the public and the escala-
tion of conflict. Some part of the greater success of the Japanese police
may lie in a more skeptical attitude toward technical solutions.
Although the contrasts drawn by Bayley are illuminating, as con-
cern with crime in America increases and as our society creeps toward
greater homogeneity, these contrasts may become less pronounced. The
boundaries between police and citizens in the United States are also
becoming more permeable, although perhaps with more mixed con-
sequences. On the one hand, as part of decoy and blending strategies
police increasingly are disguising themselves as ordinary citizens.
40
Increased attention to community relations and crime prevention and
38. P. 178.
39. Pp. 179-80.
40. Marx, The New Police Undercover Work, 4 Civ. LIBERTIES REv. July-Aug. 1977
(forthcoming).
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new service demands find police involved in an ever-widening array
of activities and places-e.g., running recreation and counseling pro-
grams in the schools. On the other hand, citizens are increasingly play-
ing quasi-police roles. Anonymous tipster programs, community "radio
watch" programs, neighborhood watches, and community police
patrols are becoming a more prominent part of American life.
Bayley tells us that in 1973, there was one policeman for every 445
people in the United States, while in Japan this figure was one for
every 585 people.41 Thus on a per capita basis there are 31% more
policemen in the United States than in Japan, and Americans spend
21% more on police services. 42 The author suggests, however, that if
Americans spent as much on police proportionally to their wealth as do
the Japanese, big gains would be forthcoming because "most ob-
servers agree that adding personnel does reduce crime and raise arrest
rates."43 Yet as the Police Foundation Kansas City patrol experiment
indicates, this is a questionable assumption.
4
-
In addition, Bayley makes no mention of the important role of
private police in both countries. A more adequate ratio of society's
police to citizens must combine the number of both public and private
police. Readings and conversations with Japanese students have left
me with the impression that private police employed by industry play
a significant and rapidly expanding role in Japanese life. Indeed, one
reason why public police may be able to be so law-abiding, and are
held in such high regard, may be the delegation of some of the dirtier
and more difficult law enforcement tasks to private police.
Bayley unfortunately tells us little about the policing of politics or
police-minority relations. In a few places lie hints at excessive force
used against students, student resentment of police, and surveillance
of radicals, but this is never developed. Bayley implies that police are
not an issue for ethnic minority groups. Ideology rather than ethnic
status or social class is the major determinant of police-citizen con-
flict. Perhaps this is because Japanese minority groups make up no
more than three percent of the population.4 5 Yet given the centrality
of minority status to American police-community conflict, an analysis
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Someone who spoke Japanese, and gathered data from students,
criminals, minorities such as the Burakumin and Koreans, radicals,
and police critics, as well as from the police and establishment figures
observed by Bayley, would surely have produced a rather different and
more critical book. Yet I think the broad contrasts would remain. As
with all good research, Bayley's work leaves one with more questions
than it resolves. Among the unresolved issues that reading the book
raised for me are the following:
Must a society be an island, disarmed, and have a relatively high
degree of consensus, integration, and homogeneity to show the enviable
police and crime patterns of Japan or England? What was involved in
the transformation of Japan (or England too) from an armed and
violent society to a relatively nonviolent one? What are the implica-
tions for similar efforts in the United States?
What accounts for the apparent tendency of police in countries such
as France, Italy, England, and Japan to be disproportionally recruited
from less urban areas? What accounts for the more politically con-
servative attitudes of police in noncommunist countries-job socializa-
tion or recruitment screening? Is family inheritance of occupation
greater for police than for most other jobs? Are stress-related ailments
such as alcoholism generally higher for police than for other occupa-
tions?
What is the impact of industrialization? Bayley occasionally hints at
how the Japanese police changed as the country industrialized. I saw
certain parallels with the United States, England, and France. What
accounts for the tendency for police to become more specialized, to
have a greater monopoly over the right to use force, and to have their
duties and operations more formally defined in law and internal
policy? What best explains the greater standardization of police prac-
tices, the greater emphasis on crime prevention and redistributive
forms of social control?
Regardless of what appear to be important similarities in historical
development, what of the future? To what extent are industrialized
states, as a result of shared problems and conditions, moving toward
common, increasingly centralized, bureaucratic, technologically based
forms of policing, regardless of economic system or national char-
acteristics? It there a long-run trend toward convergence in police
systems? As new means for the extension of police power appear, are
they invariably, if sometimes subtly, adopted? What new forms of in-
ternational policing will appear in response to political terror, smug-
gling, and complex white-collar crimes that increasingly transcend
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national boundaries? Are world police systems becoming more inter-
dependent as the nation-state itself recedes in importance?
Many of these questions can be expressed in the form of hypotheses
on the effects of police organization and industrialization. It is un-
fortunate that in his conclusion Bayley stays so close to his observa-
tions and does not generalize beyond contrasts between the United
States and Japan. Ideally case studies such as his provide the data from
which hypotheses applying to a broad array of cases can be tested. For
example, future inquiries, using a larger number of countries, might
consider hypotheses such as the following:
A. Police Organization
1. Centralized forms of police organization are associated with
more universalistic standards of enforcement and lesser police
corruption, but also with police playing a greater political role
and with greater citizen dissatisfaction.
2. Police systems with lateral entry and greater internal organi-
zational differentiation are more effective and better disciplined
than those with a system of mobility through the ranks and lesser
differentiation.
3. Police abuses are fewer, though police are less efficient, in
societies with competing and overlapping police agencies than in
those with a more monolithic structure. The same is true where
police personnel are recruited from all segments of the society
rather than solely from the dominant group.
4. The greater the power and size of public police the lesser
the significance of private police.
5. Uniformity in law enforcement standards is greatest when
police officers remain in a given position for a length of time
sufficient to gain familiarity with an area and least when they are
continually rotated or never rotated.
B. Industrialization
The more industrialized the society:
1) the greater the emphasis on crime prevention and anticipa-
tion rather than on apprehension and reaction after the fact;
2) the greater the ratio of redistributive as against repressive
forms of social control;
3) the lesser the array of tasks police are called upon to per-
form;
4) the greater the presence of specialized police roles;
5) the more distinct the line between police and citizens;
6) the greater the police monopoly over the right to use force;
1520
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7) the less discretion individual police have as their activities,
at least in principle, become more limited by rules of a legal and
bureaucratic nature;
8) the greater the unification of police organization and stan-
dardization of police practices within a country.
Social scientific understanding tends to evolve by finding apparent
differences that require explanation. A next step is documenting these
in a systematic way with primary data. A final step requires explain-
ing the differences with specific hypotheses and a coherent theory.
Bayley makes a major contribution to the first step and offers thought-
ful speculation on the meaning of contrasts in police patterns in Japan
and the United States.
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Children's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect
The Children's Cause. By Gilbert Y. Steiner, with the assistance of
Pauline H. Milius. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976.
Pp. viii, 265. $9.95 cloth; 53.95 paper.
Reviewed by Hillary Rodhamt
Reviewing a book about children for a law journal is like talking to
W. C. Fields about the subject: one senses that the audience is not
enthralled. By and large, the legal profession considers children-when
it considers them at all-as objects of domestic relations and inheri-
tance laws or as victims of the cycle of neglect, abuse, and delinquency.
Yet the law's treatment of children is undergoing great challenge and
change.' Presumptions about children's capacities are being rebutted;
the legal rights of children are being expanded. As the structure of
family life and the role of children within it evolves, the law is likely
to become ever more embroiled in social and psychological disputes
about the proper relationship between government and family. The
task for lawmakers will be to draw the line between public and
private responsibility for children.
The task will not be easy, for the rising debate over public interven-
tion in family life has been emotionally charged. To some extent this
is unavoidable. The very questions being asked invite fear and con-
fusion, since they touch deeply held and often conflicting convictions
about family autonomy and childhood needs. There are as many
policy proposals as there are theories of child-rearing. Adults advance
opinions about public policy that they consider validated by their own
personal experience as children. Professional surrogates for children
claim to want "'everything good for kids.' "2 The meandering road
toward a comprehensive children's policy is paved with good inten-
tions, most of them "as resistant to translation into legislative policy
as [they are] unexceptionable." 3
- Member, Arkansas Bar; founder and board member, Arkansas Advocates for Chil-
dren and Families; formerly associated with the Children's Defense Fund of the Wash-
ington Research Project.
1. See Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDuc. REv. 487 (1973).
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The difficulties in shaping children's policy stem not only from the
sentiments that attach to the issues but also from a cultural reluctance
to make children's needs a public responsibility. Politicians, not wish-
ing to appear as advocates of interference with the family, balk at
turning their Boys Town rhetoric into public commitments on any
but the safest of issues. Besides, for most public officials the idea of a
federal policy for children is alien. In a recent address to a conference
I attended on children's needs, a United States senator admitted he
knew nothing about the subject and would have felt more comfortable
discussing energy. Policymakers are simply not accustomed to thinking
about children's needs in the same ways they think about missile
development, dam construction, or even old-age assistance.
Despite the variety of obstacles it has confronted in its infancy,
public policy toward children is maturing into a serious political issue.
One sign of that maturity is the timely publication of The Children's
Cause, by Gilbert Y. Steiner, Director of Governmental Studies at the
Brookings Institution, with the assistance of Pauline H. Milius. Steiner
brings to his inquiry into the origin, organization, and success of
children's policies considerable experience in the political analysis of
federal programs. If the book were merely a history of certain federal
policies toward children, together with substantive information about
specific programs, it would be well worth reading. But the book
strives for more.
As Steiner describes it, "the book deals with social altruism and
self-interest as factors in the development of federal public policy
affecting children, with stability and change in intervention policy,
with the goals and the techniques of groups in and out of government
that are concerned with making and implementing that policy."4 By
subjecting the last decade of children's programs, as well as their
supporters and administrators, to rigorous scrutiny and by treating
the subject with the professional respect due serious political issues,
Steiner succeeds in stripping away much of the sentimentality, political
naivet6, and excuse-making that have served as camouflage for ineffec-
tiveness, waste, and fuzzy thinking.
The book excels as both an introduction to the policy issues sur-
rounding children's needs and a primer for political action that draws
lessons from numerous mistakes and a few successes. It is not meant
to be a "catalog of federal programs relating to children,"' but it does
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health, and preschool services, especially out-of-home child care. The
histories of the Children's Bureau, the Office of Child Development
(OCD), and the Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth are
told with insightful commentary on their roles in the development of
federal policies. Policymaking by commission, committee, and con-
ference is reviewed and properly criticized for vague recommendations
and lack of follow-through. Three private organizations established
since 1970 to work on behalf of children are evaluated, and the
activities of the most successful of these, the Children's Defense Fund
of the Washington Research Project (CDF), and of its director, Marian
Wright Edelman, are used to illustrate effective techniques of chil-
dren's advocacy. 6
On the whole, the book's conclusions, set forth in a chapter entitled
"Is a Children's Policy Feasible?," are sound and probably applicable
not only to the children's movement but also to reform efforts gen-
erally. For example, Steiner urges activists to build coalitions with
groups whose self-interest would be furthered by new policies for
children. Steiner draws this recommendation directly from the ex-
perience of the school feeding programs, expanded in large part
because of the combined pressure of school cafeteria workers and "social
altruis[ts]." 7 By analogy, he suggests that the only route to comprehen-
sive day care services lies along a way built by the teachers' unions,
which seek jobs for their members, and those day care proponents who
eventually agree to let the schools assume responsibility for whatever
program is undertaken.
Steiner makes a number of other informed recommendations. The
proponents of programs should set appropriate agendas for action by
picking realistic goals from the list of "everything good for kids." The
"jurisdictional quandary" in Congress,8 where no committee or in-
dividual has responsibility for children's programs, needs attention
and perhaps could be a subject for congressional reorganization efforts.
The Executive Branch should centralize responsibility for children's
programs, or at least the children's lobby should monitor the director-
ship and activities of OCD. These and other more specific recom-
mendations, coinciding as they do with a new Congress, a new
President, and new leadership at HEW, will likely find a receptive
audience.
The Carter Administration is on record as supporting efforts to
6. Pp. 158-75.
7. P. 244. See pp. 188-97.
8. P. 250.
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strengthen the family unit. Since many of its top policymakers are
reportedly inclined favorably toward children's programs, "saving the
family" may become the justification for, rather than remain the
nemesis of, those programs. If statistics about the declining state of the
American family are believed, a widely held perception of national
emergency, so helpful to any reform cause, may also be emerging. At
any rate, government officials charged with the task of devising pro-
grams to reverse the tide toward family disintegration certainly will
be reading The Children's Cause. Unfortunately, although the book
is in many respects useful, it may serve to perpetuate certain views
about children's policy in general and about the comprehensive ap-
proach toward children's services in particular that demand more
critical scrutiny than Steiner provides.
At the outset Steiner posits that "nonintervention serves as a basic
guiding principle rather than an absolute." Steiner's rejection of
absolutism is welcome, but it is his cautious attitude toward govern-
mental involvement in child-rearing that implicitly molds his analysis.
At critical junctures in the book's evaluation of children's programs
that have been or might have been, the noninterventionist principle
silently tips the scales, leading ultimately to Steiner's conclusion that
it would be unwise to embark on "a far more complex, universal
program" than presently exists. 10 Throughout the book Steiner seems
to be saying that, on the basis of available evidence, more comprehen-
sive, innovative proposals are politically impractical after the Nixon
veto of the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971,11 and
may be ill-advised on the merits as well. Accordingly, he urges chil-
dren's advocates to temper their demands, sharpen their practical
political skills, and work to improve and expand existing programs
for "demonstrably unlucky children whose bodies or minds are sick
or whose families are unstable or in poverty."' 12
There is nothing wrong with pressing for better programs for the
needy, but Steiner sets his sights too low. Steiner's own arguments do
9. P.1.
10. P. 255.
11. The Act, § 6(a) of the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971, S. 2007, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. 31248, 31249-56 (1971), was the first attempt to make
policy for children and their families on a comprehensive rather than piecemeal basis.
After being modified in conference, see id. at 43498, 43500-04 (joint explanatory state-
ment of conference committee), the bill was sent to the President. The Nixon veto
message, which charged that the Act would "commit the vast moral authority of the
National Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against
the family-centered approach," id. at 46059, was a stunning rebuff not only to the Act
itself but also to the very concept of a comprehensive approach.
12. P. 255.
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not require an exclusive choice between compensatory programs-those
that attempt to remedy deficiencies in a particular child population-
and comprehensive programs-those that provide services for the en-
tire child population. Indeed, they suggest the need for further efforts
in both areas. Regrettably, Steiner's conclusion may well become a
self-fulfilling prophecy unless the flaws in his analysis are exposed.
The flaws can be pinpointed by examining two familiar corollaries
of the noninterventionist principle, both of which help shape Steiner's
evaluation of federal policy toward children. The first corollary is
that in order to overcome the noninterventionist impulse the evidence
supporting proposed or ongoing children's programs must be greater
than that necessary to overcome resistance to change in other areas of
public policy. Whether the greater burden borne by proponents of
children's programs is appropriate is rarely questioned, though it
warrants consideration. After all, no new policy is fail-safe. Legislators
and executives take risks of all kinds when they decide to build a
nuclear plant or introduce a deadly pesticide or advocate no-fault
insurance. There is no way to predict fully the effects of a policy that
is ambitious, yet untried, especially one taking shape amidst the con-
flicting claims of proponents who foresee extraordinary benefits and
opponents who see the handwriting on the wall and the dominoes on
the table.
Several federal initiatives for children have been dragged down by
this special burden of proof. For his part, Steiner seems agreeable, or
perhaps oblivious, to this situation; for whatever reason, he does not
protest. In discussing the program of early and periodic screening,
diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT), which was mandated as one of
several 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, Steiner first notes
that Congress did not fully consider the costs or scope of EPSDT; by
default HEW was given considerable responsibility to define and de-
fend the program. Steiner then describes at length "an apparent deci-
sion by HEW to flout the law"13 by bureaucratic procrastination: final
EPSDT regulations were not issued by the Department until seven
years after Congress enacted the program. Nevertheless, Steiner con-
cludes that "[t]he obvious lesson [of EPSDT] is that providing health
services to poor children is too complex, too expensive, and too
consequential a matter to be legislated without a plan."' 4 A balanced
critique of EPSDT might properly take Congress to task for laying
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Surely, however, there have been instances where an energetic and
imaginative administration has overcome poorly drafted legislation.
To suggest that EPSDT was doomed by its authorizing legislation is
to discount the destructive role of the program's administrators, who
never gave it a chance to succeed.
Sometimes even successful children's programs cannot bear the
burden imposed by the first corollary. After tracing the rise and fall
of maternal and child health project grants, for example, Steiner con-
cludes that the program "seemed to show important success in preven-
tive health care" but it "was never considered for a multi-year exten-
sion."1u Indeed, by 1975 the Ford Administration was proposing
"sharp cuts in federal financing of community health services, includ-
ing the now-unified maternal and child health grants,"' 6 based on the
unfounded belief that recipients of care and insurers would pick up
the difference. Although the disorganization among grants supporters
and the lack of concerted congressional action are evidence of the
program's political weakness, the first corollary must be given its due
in explaining why successful programs for children suffer the same
fate as unproven ones.
The second corollary underlying the book's critique is that chil-
dren's programs, once underway, should be judged more quickly and
harshly than other programs. Perhaps because of the initial ambiva-
lence toward the introduction of a new program, support for the
program rests on a shaky consensus easily shattered if the promised
goals are not speedily and smoothly achieved. That the rush to judg-
ment has occurred in a number of instances is unquestionable.
Whether it is appropriate is worthy of more discussion than the book
provides.
One of the clearest examples of this second corollary in operation is
Steiner's treatment of the Head Start program. Before Head Start,
federal support for child care was always linked to national emer-
gencies like the Depression or World War II. Arguments favoring the
provision of child care services stressed the need to put women to
work in WPA projects or armaments production or remove them from
swollen welfare rolls. Before the 1960s, the potential benefits of such
services to the children themselves clearly were not a primary con-
sideration. New psychological theories challenging traditional beliefs
in fixed intelligence and predetermined development coincided with
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discovering hunger and poverty, these theories flourished and assumed
political as well as scientific significance. If a child's intelligence could
be improved through extrafamilial services, could a government re-
frain from establishing them? The answer from the generals of the War
on Poverty was predictable: they decided to offer unprecedented public
services to preschool children, primarily from poor families. Congress
and affected parents supported the effort, according to Steiner, largely
because of the claims that substantial individual cognitive gains would
result.1 7 Therefore, when preliminary evaluation of Head Start, espe-
cially the Westinghouse study,' failed to corroborate those claims,
disillusionment dampened the program's widespread popularity."'
Steiner recognizes that the program commands sufficient political
support to resist attempted cutbacks and that it provides "intellectual
respectability to out-of-home child care under public auspices."'0
Nevertheless, Steiner shares the disappointment of some early Head
Start backers and downplays the significance of positive findings about
the program's effects in areas other than cognitive development. His
uncritical acceptance of the Westinghouse study findings reflects the
force of the second corollary, that children's programs may properly
be judged more quickly and harshly than other government programs.
Head Start embodied a theory about the sources and quality of intelli-
gence whose validity was not confirmed in the first years of the experi-
ment. But this should have been neither surprising nor disillusioning.
Analyses in other policy areas presume difficulties in program design
and implementation; years may be spent testing and revising a theory.
Surely a theory about children's intelligence deserves more time to be
tested than either the adherents of the Westinghouse report or Steiner
give it. This is especially true in the light of studies completed since
Westinghouse, which call into question the Westinghouse conclusion
that the full-year Head Start program is only "marginally effective in
producing gains in cognitive development." 2' Apparently we share so
17. See pp. 29-35.
18. Westinghouse Learning Corp. & Ohio University, The Impact of Head Start: An
Evaluation of the Effects of Head Start On Children's Cognitive and Affective Develop-
ment 2-7 (June 1969) (executive summary). The report presents the results of a study
comparing Head Start participants with children in a control group. The study concluded
that the summer Head Start program had no significant impact on learning readiness or
academic achievement and that, in most cases, the rather small cognitive gains achieved
by the children in full-year Head Start programs faded after the children entered school.
19. For example, a planned endorsement of Head Start by President Nixon was
diluted. Pp. 32-33.
20. P. 35.
21. Westinghouse Learning Corp. & Ohio University, supra note 18, at 7. See, e.g., A.
Mann et al., A Review of Head Start Research Since 1969: Working Draft (Social Re-
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much apprehension about potential harm to cherished, albeit fanta-
sized, family values that programs for children must demonstrate im-
mediate success or risk extinction, even in the face of subsequent
evidence of achievement.
The book's comparison of fledgling proposals for day care services
with the well-established school lunch program exemplifies the folly
of judging developments in this field too hastily. Steiner calls the
national school lunch program "the success story of the children's
cause." 2 He observes that "[wi]hile comprehensive child development,
child-care centers, and child welfare services have floundered, school
lunch has flourished." 23 Steiner traces the school lunch program's
development from a form of farm relief to a middle class subsidy with
nutritional justifications to a broad-based feeding effort giving pri-
ority to needy children and providing breakfast and summer feeding
services as well. Farmers, congressmen, school cafeteria workers, private
lobbies, and citizens concerned about the effect of malnutrition on
school achievement formed a coalition over a number of years. The
coalition gradually built toward the legislative activity between 1970
and 1975 that resulted in an expanded feeding program. During these
five years the number of free and reduced-price lunches and breakfasts
increased despite the declining school population.2 4 Now that most
of the children who need a free lunch have access to one, Steiner con-
cludes that reformers should turn their attention to the "timely and
politically realistic" goal of broader access to reduced-price lunches
and breakfasts..2 5 This goal may be timely and realistic today, but it
took 40 years of incremental, sometimes uncertain progress to reach
this point. The feeding programs once had to overcome congressional
concerns about "further federal participation in 'providing food,
clothing, and the other necessities of life.' "26 It is premature to sug-
gest that current proposals for child care, which face the very same
concerns, cannot likewise surmount them.
Steiner's predisposition toward nonintervention distorts not only
his evaluation of past and present children's policies but also his assess-
ment of the prospects for a comprehensive approach to children's needs
in the future. The need for a comprehensive child care program was
search Group, George Washington University Dec. 1976). Remarkably, although the
Westinghouse findings have been challenged repeatedly since their publication, Steiner
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accepted by a majority of Congress just six years ago. The legislative
purpose was to assist the American family to meet children's needs, not
because Congress questioned the traditional role of the family but
because it perceived unprecedented challenges to many families'
abilities and resources.27 Within Congress there was much disagree-
ment about the appropriate system for delivering services, but very
little about the propriety of or necessity for extending them.23
Steiner attributes passage of the bill not to its merits but to its dis-
organized opposition, which coalesced too late to secure any action
short of a presidential veto. But the lack of organized opposition and
the other favorable circumstances Steiner cites to explain the bill's
success do not refute the case for the bill made in weeks of investiga-
tion and testimony. Had serious and timely questions been raised, the
case could have been sharpened and the flaws in the bill corrected,
but the Nixon veto message was totally unexpected. When it came,
according to Steiner, it proved embarrassing even to some Republi-
cans.
2 9
If Steiner's information is correct, the veto was not really a rejection
of child development policy but merely a sop to opponents of the
President's new China policy.30 Nevertheless, Steiner seems to regard
the veto as a true measure of enduring political opposition to com-
prehensive children's policies. But before assuming that the veto
message nailed the coffin on comprehensive children's policies, changes
in the political constellation since 1971 should be surveyed. Richard
Nixon is no longer President; James Buckley, the force behind the
veto message, has been replaced in the Senate by Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, who was, while serving in the Nixon Administration, a
supporter of the comprehensive services approach. These changes will
not in themselves guarantee the passage of a comprehensive child
development bill or other sweeping legislation, but they are indicative
of a much more favorable climate than Steiner discerns.
Even if a full-fledged comprehensive program were not immediately
feasible or desirable, surrender to a piecemeal approach would be un-
warranted. Given the legislative and administrative inexperience with
comprehensive children's programs, it might be wise to begin on a
limited, experimental scale. Proponents of different types of programs
could assume responsibility for testing them under competent govern-
27. Statement of Findings and Purpose, Comprehensive Child Development Act of
1971, S. 2007, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(a), 117 CONG. REc. 31248, 31249 (1971).
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ment auspices. If Albert Shanker wants the teachers to control day
care programs, let him have an experimental grant for a few years to
explore how he and those with whom he works would administer the
program and what benefits would accrue to children. Bettye Cald-
well's landmark child development project is part of the Little Rock,
Arkansas school district and might provide a model for similar efforts
in other environments. The Children's Defense Fund could be given
financial support to coordinate projects under various community
control models, thereby affording an opportunity to evaluate the
claims CDF makes for that form of public intervention. If these kinds
of experiments were adequately funded and patiently observed, they
would do much to generate the reliable evidence needed to make in-
formed assessments of alternative public policies.
Refinement of established programs, such as Head Start, may pro-
vide another avenue for experimentation in child development policy.
Recent evidence indicates that Head Start is achieving not only its
original purpose, namely cognitive gains, but also improvements in
children's social behavior, parental attitudes, community involvement,
and children's health.31 This successful evolution suggests that the
program should be strengthened and expanded within its present
structure with an eye to testing the comprehensive approach.
In light of these opportunities for change, Steiner's failure to endorse
a comprehensive approach to children's policies is disappointing. In
advocating more of the same compensatory programs, Steiner fails to
recognize that the compensatory and comprehensive approaches are
complementary and should be pursued simultaneously. By the same
token, incremental programs can be expanded into more comprehen-
sive ones, and even limited comprehensive programs like Head Start
may form a unified framework within which both established and
emerging programs can flourish. Nevertheless, despite Steiner's un-
necessarily cautious recommendations his book is a welcome addition
to the all too limited body of literature in this field. It will be of
significant assistance to children's lobbyists and policymakers, as well
as to citizens ready to join the debate about the future of children's
policy.
31. See A. Mann et al., supra note 21, at 8, 21-29 (cognitive gains); id. at 9, 34-35
(children's social behavior); id. at 12, 38-39 (parental attitudes); id. at 15, 42-43 (com-
munity involvement); id. at 16, 45-46 (children's health).
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Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality. By Julius G. Get-
man, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne B. Herman. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1976. Pp. xvii, 218. $7.00.
Reviewed by David L. Shapirot
Despite the emphasis on considerations of social policy in modern
jurisprudence, many legal rules are based upon assumptions about
human behavior that have yet to be sustained or refuted by systematic
empirical study. In addition to such awesome questions as the deterrent
effect of the criminal laws and the fairness of the adversary system,1
there are countless, more modest questions that may be asked. For
example, are jurors consciously or subconsciously influenced by pre-
trial publicity despite their willingness to swear under oath that they
are not? How effective are the Miranda warnings2 in making those in
custody aware of their rights? Is the rule excluding unlawfully seized
evidence the best way to deter law enforcement officials from violating
the Fourth Amendment? Are voters in National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) representation elections affected by the campaigns conducted
by unions and employers, and in particular, are they influenced by
threats or promises about the consequences of their votes?
It is to this last question, and a number of related ones, that the
authors of the present book have addressed themselves.3 In a study of
representation elections that took about a decade from conception to
publication and that must have cost a small fortune, the authors set
out to test many of the assumptions on which the NLRB based its
rules; proceeding from their conclusion that most of those assumptions
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. For an interesting study in a simulated setting, which is, unfortunately, almost
impenetrable to the uninitiated like me, see LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut,
Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258 (1976). See also
id. at 259 n.5 (citing other authorities).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a study of the Miranda warning in
one context, see Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967).
3. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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are unsound, the authors have recommended a sweeping revision. The
study is an invaluable one, not only because it raises serious questions
about the wisdom of the Board's rules, but also because it makes us
think about the desirability of undertaking such studies, about what
to do with the results, and about the extent to which rules purportedly
based on assumptions that are not empirically supported may neverthe-
less be justified on other grounds. These questions are all complicated
by the fact that the study, like almost every similar investigation I
have ever come across, can be and has been criticized for its method-
ology and conclusions. 4
In the opening chapter, the authors set the stage by summarizing
the Board's rules governing representation elections5 and the assump-
tions underlying those rules. To ensure the unimpeded exercise of
free choice by employees, the Board decided that elections must be
conducted under "laboratory conditions." Since employees were
thought to be attentive to the campaign, to be unsophisticated about
labor relations, and to be easily swayed, the Board has held that cam-
paign statements by employers that might be interpreted as threats of
reprisal or promises of benefit are grounds for setting aside an election
and holding a new one, as are such other reminders of employer power
as interrogations and meetings with employehs in small groups. And,
at the time of the study, certain material misrepresentations and in-
flammatory appeals, though unrelated to employer or union power,
were also grounds for setting an election aside because " '[t]hey create
conditions which make impossible a sober, informed exercise of the
franchise.' "7
The authors' exposition, only partially summarized here, is on the
whole a fair one, but there are some gaps and one puzzling statement
4. See Symposium-Four Perspectives on Union Representation Elections: Law and
Realty, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1976). The four reviews in this symposium, though each
praises the book in many respects, also contain numerous criticisms of the authors'
methodology and conclusions. The dissenting opinions in Shopping Kart Food Market,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1709-12 (1977) (discussed in Part II infra),
also criticize the study.
5. The NLRB's authority to conduct union representation elections derives from § 9
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
6. The phrase was first used in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M.
1337, 1341 (1948). In the same opinion the Board explained, "In election proceedings, it
is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be con-
ducted under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees." Id., 21 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
7. P. 18 (quoting Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962)).
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about the law. In suggesting the possibility that threats by employers
might be neutralized by the union, the authors say:
if the employer threatens to close the plant contingent on a union
victory, the union organizer presumably will respond that the
employer cannot do so as a matter of law, will not do so as long
as the plant is profitable, and that the union has no intention of
making it unprofitable.8
If the authors are suggesting that the italicized union response is an
accurate statement of the law, they are not correct, in view of the
Supreme Court's unfortunate decision in the Darlington case.0 A total
shutdown, even if motivated solely by hostility to the union, is not
unlawful, and a partial shutdown is only unlawful if the employer is
motivated by a desire to influence his remaining employees. Even a
plant relocation based on hostility to the union, though unlawful,
may not be subject to a remedy that will make the injured employees
whole. 10 And of course, problems of proof in such cases are enormous.
All this casts some doubt on the rather facile suggestion that unions
can effectively counteract those threats, especially when they are thinly
veiled by the argument that it may be economically necessary to move
or to shut down if the union wins.
Moreover, the authors make no effort in this chapter to explore in
any depth some of the arguments that might be made for and against
the Board's rules and that have little to do with assumptions about
voter behavior. Remarkably, the First Amendment is not even men-
tioned, although it surely plays a role in determining how far the
Board may go in regulating campaign propaganda.' Nor is there dis-
cussion of whether any of the rules here described are warranted by
the need to preserve the appearance of fairness in the election,1 2 or to
reduce or eliminate the bitterness that may poison the bargaining
relation if the union wins.
Finally, although the authors do indicate that the Board has wavered
in its policies over the years, and that the Board's rules have met a
8. P. 13 (emphasis added).
9. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
10. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 282 (8th
ed. 1977).
11. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 66-106 (1964).
12. The authors do refer to a few rules, such as that prohibiting fraternization by
Board agents with either side, as "designed to protect the impartial atmosphere," and to
other rules, like that prohibiting distribution of a facsimile of an official ballot in a
manner suggesting Board endorsement of a particular choice, as reflecting the Board's
"desire to protect its processes." P. 18.
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mixed reception in the courts, they give neither the full flavor of the
Board's oscillations nor any sense of the dissension within the Board
that has almost always existed.1" Perhaps these shortcomings are the
result of the authors' desire to present the premises to be tested in as
uncluttered a way as they can without delaying the discussion of the
results.
Chapter 2 describes in detail the methodology of the study. Thirty-
one elections were selected for the project, with "the primary con-
sideration . . . the likelihood of vigorous, possible [sic] unlawful cam-
paigning."' Two waves of voter interviews were conducted, the first
beginning as soon as possible after an election had been ordered and a
list of eligible voters obtained from the Board. (One of the notable
byproducts of the study was a landmark opinion holding that the
authors were entitled to these lists under the Freedom of Information
Act. 15) The purpose of this first interview was to obtain information
about the voter, his voting intentions, and his attitudes towards his
work, his employer, and the union. The second wave of interviews,
conducted after the election, was designed primarily to determine how
the voter voted and why, his recollection of the issues raised by both
sides, and his perception of threats, promises, or other practices that
might justify setting the election aside or even requiring the employer
to bargain with the union despite the results.
I have little training in survey techniques; even so, I was generally
impressed with the meticulousness of the study plan. But I was struck
with the failure to include in the project any elections in which a
vigorous campaign was not foreseen. (And I later discovered that I
was not alone in raising this question.' 6) If judgments are to be made
about the effect of vigorous campaigns on the voters, is it not essential
to have a control group in which such campaigning does not occur?
13. For examples of disagreement within the Board during recent years in the area of
campaign practices, see, e.g., the cases discussed in 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 65-70 (1976); 40
NLRB ANN. REP. 78-81 (1975); 39 NLRB ANN. REP. 65-69 (1974); 38 NLRB ANN. REP.
73-77 (1973); 37 NLRB ANN. RE'. 72-74 (1972). For even more recent disagreements, see
Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977); In-
formation Magnetics Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 216, 94 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1977); GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 94 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1976).
14. P. 34. The authors state in Chapter 2 that 31 elections were studied, although at
various points, e.g., p. 75 (Table 4-1), 33 elections are referred to. Two elections are
omitted from the tables; I am sure there is an explanation of the discrepancy some-
where, but I was unable to find it.
15. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. See Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's Point
of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1976). Professor Eames and I seem to be at odds
about the significance of this failure with respect to the authors' critical conclusions in
Chapter 5. See pp. 1539-40 infra.
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The authors tell us only that they limited their selection because they
"wanted to test the effect of the campaign, particularly unlawful
campaigning, on voting behavior."'17 Although this may be an ex-
planation if the authors' sole purpose had been to study the effects of
unlawful campaigns, it is hardly an explanation for the lack of a con-
trol group in studying the effects of campaigns in general. The authors
were evidently quite successful in their efforts; they report that in 20
elections both parties campaigned vigorously after the Wave I inter-
view and that in 28 at least one party engaged in vigorous cam-
paigning.' At another point they report that there was no election in
which the company raised less than 8 issues or the union less than
11; 19 and at still another they relate that in every election "the em-
ployer made statements that could be interpreted as threats of reprisal
or promises of benefit." 20
There is at least one strong clue that the elections studied were
atypical because of the vigorous campaigning. NLRB annual reports
for the last several years, including the years covered by the study,
show that unions win approximately 50% of one-union representation
elections; 21 but in the study itself, unions won only 8 or approximately
25%. This may in part have been the result of the fact that the authors
selected units that were, on the average, larger than the average size
of units in which Board elections are conducted,22 since the Board's
reports show that unions tend to do better in small units than in large
ones.2 3 But we do not know whether and to what extent the campaign
itself made a difference.
In the third chapter, the authors begin their report and analysis of
the results of the study. The principal theme of this chapter is that
despite the Board's assumptions about the fragility of voter choice,
17. P. 34.
18. P. 35.
19. P. 75 (Table 4-1). This table also shows that the average number of company
issues raised was 29.79 and that in only 5 elections did the number of company issues
raised fall below 20.
20. P. 128.
21. See, e.g., 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 236 (1976) (Table 13); 38 NLRB AN,,. REP. 231
(1973) (Table 13); 37 NLRB ANN. REP. 248 (1972) (Table 13).
22. The authors state: "While only 13 percent of all NLRB elections conducted during
fiscal 1973 were in units of more than one hundred employees, 45 percent of the elections
we studied during that period were in units with more than one hundred employees."
P. 35.
23. The Board's statistics for the same year, fiscal 1973, show that of 7687 representa-
tion elections involving units of less than 100 employees, unions lost 3545, or 46%. Of
1229 elections involving units of 100 or more employees, unions lost 723, or 59%. See 38
NLRB ANN. REP. 246 (1973) (Table 17). The authors' study covered units ranging from
4 to just under 400, with an average of 96. P. 35. Thus the results in the elections studied
were atypical, even taking into account the size of the units involved.
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"[t]he data indicate ...that employees have strong and stable pre-
dispositions to vote for or against union representation. ' 24 Indeed,
"[t]he votes of 81 percent of the employees could be predicted from
their pre-campaign attitudes and intent.' 2 5
That most employees stick to their intention throughout the cam-
paign and into the voting booth is not particularly surprising. What
is surprising, and what seems downplayed by the authors, is that "[p]re-
dispositions [i.e., predictions based on attitude and intent] failed to
predict vote accurately for 19 percent of the employees interviewed."26
This seems rather high to me. How does it compare with other kinds
of elections? How would it compare with union representation elec-
tions in which vigorous campaigns are not conducted? One can only
guess, but it seems significant (though the authors mention it only in
passing) that a much higher percentage of those who did not vote in
accordance with their expressed intent switched away from the union
than switched to it.27 Has the Board really been so off base in proceed-
ing on the assumption that employees' choices are fragile if the
percentage of switchers in vigorous campaigns is so high? Perhaps it
has, since the authors also report that expressed intent in Wave I was
an accurate predictor of outcome in 29 of 31 elections. But after all,
application of that margin of error to the total number of NLRB
representation elections held in the last fiscal year would indicate that
of 8,638 elections, initial intent would not be an accurate predictor of
the outcome in 557 cases..
2 S
Chapter 4 is the first of the two major chapters documenting the
results of the study. Here the authors deal generally with the effect of
the campaign on the vote and make a number of important points:
1. Despite the Board's assumption that employees are attentive to
the campaign, "[t]he average employee . . .could remember only 10
percent of the company campaign issues and 7 percent of the union
issues."29
2. There was no significant difference between the familiarity of
company voters with the issues and that of union voters. (Compare
point 6 below.)
24. P. 72. The authors contribute to the preservation of the purity of the language by
consistently using "data" as a plural noun.
25. Id.
26. P. 70.
27. P. 64. The authors state that "94 percent of the employees intending to vote for
the company did so, as did 82 percent of those intending to vote for the union." Id.
28. See 41 NLRB ANN. RFa,. 236 (1976) (Table 13).
29. P. 109.
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3. Written materials, meetings, and personal contact increase voter
familiarity with the issues.
4. There is a high correlation between the reasons given for voting
and the campaign issues, suggesting that the campaign serves to
"awaken or strengthen" voter predispositions."
5. The authors "could find no characteristics that served to dis-
tinguish the successful employer [or union] campaigns from those less
successful." 3 '
6. Voters who switched to the union were more familiar with the
union's issues and more likely to have attended union meetings than
those who did not switch.
7. Voters who switched to the company were no more familiar with
the company's issues than voters who stayed with the union.
In short, though the campaign, especially the union's campaign,
may make a difference, voters do not pay much attention and it is
impossible to tell what makes for a successful campaign.
This is all quite interesting, especially the authors' confession that
they could not tell what makes a campaign succeed. But I am left with
some queasiness about it all. Would we not have learned more about
the effect of the campaign, and perhaps even about what makes a
"successful" campaign, if there had been a control group of elections
in which no significant campaign had been waged, at least by the
company? And was familiarity with campaign issues really so low
when, for example, 40% of employees reported "improvements not
dependent on unionization" as an issue in elections in which the issue
was used, 35% reported "plant closing/moving may follow unioniza-
tion (nonretaliatory)," and 30% reported "loss of benefits may follow
unionization (nonretaliatory)"?
32
Moreover, although the authors stress that more union voters than
company voters reported a "job loss theme" as a campaign issue,
33 it
would also be interesting to know how those company voters would
have voted had there been no such theme-a determination admittedly
difficult if not impossible to make. And though I cannot argue with
the conclusion that no discernible characteristics distinguished success-
ful from unsuccessful campaigns, I cannot help thinking that there
must be useful data in view of the fact that the average loss in union
support in all 31 elections was only 4%, yet in the five most successful
30. P. 97.
31. P. 101. See also p. 103.
32. P. 78 (Table 4-2).
33. P. 88.
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company campaigns, the loss averaged 35%.a4 Finally, the conclusion
that familiarity with the union's campaign did make a difference sug-
gests that familiarity with the company's campaign may have as well,
at least for some voters, even if company voters as a group demon-
strated no more familiarity than did union voters. Would the com-
pany have done as well without conducting a campaign?
The authors, then, do not shrink from reporting results that seem
at odds with their thesis, but their conclusions tend to downplay the
contradictory findings, or at least fail to give them full recognition.
Chapter 5 is, to my mind, the crux of the book and in many ways its
most persuasive part because there was a control group for that part
of the study. In exploring the effect of "unlawful campaigning" on
the vote, the authors determined that in 22 of the 31 elections, the
employer engaged in unlawful conduct, and that in 9 of those 22, the
conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant an order to bargain35 Thus,
the 31 elections could be divided into 3 categories: "bargaining order"
elections, "unlawful" elections in which company conduct warranted
setting aside the election but not the extreme sanction of an order to
bargain, and a control group of "clean" elections.
Against this background, the authors concluded: (1) In none of the
three categories did a significantly greater percentage of "potential
union voters" vote against the union. (2) About one-third of em-
ployees interviewed reported unlawful tactics by the company, but the
percentage was as high in clean elections as in the other categories!
(3) Union voters more frequently reported unlawful tactics than did
company voters. (4) Any discharge of a union supporter was likely to
be perceived by employees as unlawfully motivated, whether it was or
not, but such discharges did not appear to have a coercive effect on
those employees. (5) Unlawful interrogation did not appear to have a
coercive effect either on the employees interrogated or on other em-
ployees.
Were I an employer, I would read this chapter several times. It
certainly suggests that staying within the law is one way of doing well
by doing good. Chances of winning at the polls are at least as great, if
not greater, than if unlawful acts, threats, or promises are used, and
34. P. 100.
35. These conclusions were reached by the authors on the basis of the Board's dis-
position of any unfair labor practice charges or objections to the election in those cases
in which such charges or objections were filed, and on the informal conclusions of an
NLRB administrative law judge in all other cases where arguably unlawful speech or
conduct occurred. "'The judge reviewed this speech and conduct as be would have done
if they had been submitted to him in his official capacity." P. 111.
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of course the results of the vote will stand up against challenge. Since
employees seem to get the message of possible loss of jobs or benefits
in any event, there is no point in being blunt about it.
As a more neutral observer, I am also impressed with the findings,
and I note only a few reservations to what seems a most significant set
of conclusions. First, if the lid were really off, if an employer could say
anything and could do many things he cannot now lawfully do, would
the results be the same? My guess is that they would, but is it worth
taking the risk to find out? Second, although the authors deny that it
is statistically significant (and I am in no position to say otherwise), it
is interesting to note that of the originally undecided voters, 60%
voted for the company in clean elections, 65% in unlawful elections,
and 79% in bargaining order elections.3" Third, even though potential
union voters who voted for the union reported unlawful company
campaigning more often than did potential union voters who switched
to the company, one still wonders what the conscious or subconscious
effect of unlawful conduct was on the voters who did in fact switch.
In a brief sixth chapter, the authors conclude, on the basis of sub-
stantial evidence, that card signing is an accurate indication of em-
ployee choice and an accurate predictor of the ultimate vote. My only
comment on this chapter is that employees who sign union representa-
tion cards seem to be a different breed from law school students who
signed petitions during the golden era of such documents and who
frequently disavowed any knowledge of their contents after signing
them.
In the seventh and final chapter, the authors summarize their con-
clusions and set forth their recommendations for change. The Board's
assumptions about voter behavior are unsound; in reality, employee
predispositions are critical and the campaign not all that significant.
Moreover, the factors that do cause loss of union support are un-
related to employee perceptions of unlawful activity or to Board
determinations that such activity has occurred. Although switches to
the union are evidently related to the receipt of information about the
union, switching to the company "is more likely to be due to the
intensification of currently held attitudes than to new information
36. P. 115 (Table 5-3). (This point is also raised, somewhat more aggressively, in
Eames, supra note 16, at 1188-89.) According to Table 5-3, 9% of union card-signers
voted for the company in clean elections and 16% in unlawful elections, a difference
which the authors say is statistically significant. P. 116. But since only 11% of card-
signers voted for the company in bargaining order elections, the authors conclude that
there is no significant difference between clean elections on the one hand, and unlawful
and bargaining order elections combined, on the other. Id.
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conveyed in the employer's campaign," 37 even information apparently
intended to coerce.
Accordingly, the authors propose that the Board should revise its
rules to provide, inter alia, that threats, promises, misrepresentations,
or other statements are not grounds for setting aside an election, nor
are interrogation of employees, the granting of benefits, or resorting
to reprisals, although the last should continue to be an unfair labor
practice. Some rules (like that prohibiting agents of the Board from
fraternizing with agents of the parties) may be necessary, however, to
preserve the appearance of fairness; and certain practices such as un-
lawful discharges may warrant bargaining orders not because of the
effect of discharges on voters, but because the remedy would serve as
a powerful deterrent. Finally, steps should be taken to give unions
greater access to employees during campaigns, both because such access
does appear to make a difference and because equal opportunity to
communicate is "fundamental to the democratic process." 38 The risks
involved in the proposed deregulation would be far outweighed by
such gains as the savings in administrative costs that would result from
less Board involvement in election challenges.
Since many of these recommendations are derived from the data in
the fifth chapter, they seem well based and persuasive. They gain
additional support from the argument (not explicitly made by the
authors) that deregulation of campaign propaganda is consistent with
First Amendment values, and from the argument that the costs of regu-
lation are an inefficient use of limited resources. I do wish, however,
that we knew more than the study tells us about the differences be-
tween elections in which there is an active campaign and those in
which there is not, and about the factors which cause voters to switch
and which make for a successful campaign-factors which in the end
seem to elude the authors. And I cannot escape the conclusion that
in their enthusiasm for their own empirical data, the authors have
belittled the importance of considerations not grounded in those data.
While suggesting that some marginal rules may be warranted by the
need to preserve the appearance of fairness, and urging that greater
union access is justified by "fundamental" principles, the authors do
not really consider whether no-holds-barred campaigns, in which
employers may threaten, promise, and in general do what they will,
may so poison the air and polarize the community that, if the com-
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the company's tactics and, if the company loses, a satisfactory bargain-
ing relationship may never develop. Perhaps we should take the
plunge, but at least we should be aware of all the possible con-
sequences.
II
Given a study of this thoroughness and importance, the question for
the Board is what to do about it. The Board's first public response, in
April 1977, has been to modify its "laboratory conditions" standard
by overruling its own Hollywood Ceramics39 decision on the effect of
misrepresentations. Members Penello and Walther stated in Shop-
ping Kart Food Market, Inc.40 that misrepresentations will no longer
be grounds for setting aside an election in the absence of deceptive
practices involving the Board or the use of forged documents. Relying
heavily on a law review article by Getman and Goldberg that preceded
their book and that summarized the data and conclusions relating to
misrepresentations, 41 these members said that "Board rules in this area
must be based on a view of employees as mature individuals who are
capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and dis-
counting it."142 While suggesting that the study supported their view
that "ours is the more accurate model of employee behavior, ' 43 these
two members gave the assurance that "[w]e shall, of course, continue
our policy of overseeing other campaign conduct which interferes with
employee free choice outside the area of misrepresentations.
'44
Chairman Murphy, whose concurring vote was critical to the result,
made no mention of the study although she did note that employees
should be treated as "mature adults capable of recognizing and evalu-
ating campaign rhetoric for what it is."4.3 She expressed agreement
with the basic purpose of Hollywood Ceramics-the assurance of free
choice-and voiced regret that the case had been badly misapplied and
expanded. She then reserved the right to vote to set aside elections in
"the most extreme situations" where there was an "egregious mistake
of fact,"'40 and emphasized her continued willingness to set an election
39. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
40. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977). A recent comment on this 3-2
decision suggests that, since it is favorable to employers, it may well be "the 'last
hurrah' of the Nixon-Ford Board." Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in
NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1441, 1448 n.36 (1977).
41. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regula-
tion of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263
(1976). Several other sources were also cited.
42. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
43. Id. at 1707.
44. Id. at 1708.
45. Id. at 1708 (concurring opinion).
46. Id.
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aside "in the event of misconduct involving threats, promises of
benefits or similar improprieties.
'47
Member Fanning, in his dissent, took direct issue with the study on
some grounds that have been mentioned here and some that have not.
In addition, he referred to the appearance of fairness in the election
as lending stability to the bargaining process, made the somewhat
startling argument that the high degree of voter participation in
NLRB elections may have been "encouraged by the long-standing
policy that Hollywood Ceramics represents," 4 and hinted darkly that
the majority may be taking only the first step "in dispensing with
time-honored election safeguards." 49 In an angrier dissent, Member
Jenkins sharply criticized the logic and conclusions of the study,
argued that the authors drew inconsistent conclusions, and ended by
pointing to the "inescapable fact" that many card majorities have been
lost, and bargaining orders required, after unlawful conduct by
employers.50
With all respect, it seems to me that whatever position one may
take on the merits, it is hard to view the Board's approach in the
Shopping Kart case as anything but misguided. On the one hand, the
majority simply referred to the study without any consideration of
its strengths and weaknesses; the dissenters, on the other hand, tried
only to score debaters' points against it without any pretense at ob-
jectivity. And the crucial swing voter did not explicitly address herself
to the study at all. Moreover, the case was one in which all five mem-
bers evidently agreed that the representations made by the union were
not grounds for setting aside the election even under the Hollywood
Ceramics test.51 Since it dealt with one of the less important rules
governing campaign practices, Shopping Kart was not in any event
the best vehicle for considering the study's significance, and simply
led to an unexplained affirmation of other existing rules-an affirma-
tion justly called in question by the dissent. And the dissenters, while
defending their own assumptions about what may influence a voter's
decision, made only a halting attempt to support the Hollywood
Ceramics rule on grounds quite unrelated to those assumptions.
There could hardly be a better illustration of the inappropriateness
of squeezing considerations of legislative policy into the unaccom-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1711 (dissenting opinion).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1712.
51. The Regional Director and the two dissenters believed that the election should
not be set aside because the union official who made the misrepresentation would not
have been perceived by employees as a credible source. Id. at 1709.
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modating mold of an adjudication. Instead of a full and open dis-
cussion, by all those concerned, of the study's methodology and con-
clusions, of its relevance to all of the Board's rules in the area of
campaign practices, and of the question whether some or all of these
rules may find their justification on other grounds, we have little
more than an endorsement of the study by two members of a three-
member majority in a case in which it may not even have been ad-
dressed by the litigants and in which its conclusions were in no way
essential to the result. Moreover, I believe the majority purported to
commit itself to following existing authority in other areas involving
campaign practices more on the basis of the need to reassure the
Board's constituency than on the basis of reason or policy.
The Board appears to be one of the last holdouts against the pres-
sures from courts and commentators to develop policy through rule-
making rather than adjudication.5 2 Whatever the scope of the Board's
power to define unfair labor practices by rule, there seems little doubt
that it could promulgate rules, in accordance with the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act,53 defining
its policies with respect to the setting aside of elections. Yet even when
it decided to require employers to turn over the names and addresses
of employees to unions after elections had been ordered, and to make
its requirement effective not in the case at hand but only thirty days
after its decision, it chose to do so in an adjudicatory proceeding.54
Although it had its wrist slapped by the Supreme Court for choosing
this course,55 the rule survived, along with the Board's continuing
refusal to formulate policy in rulemaking.
Perhaps the Board's reluctance to follow the rulemaking route
results in part from the view that its frequent changes in policy would
be more visible, and thus more embarrassing, if such changes were
made by amending an outstanding regulation. But surely the Board
is wrong if it thinks that changes in direction are less likely to be
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Operating Engineers
Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-
Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970);
Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70
YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965). Even since the
Wyman-Gordon decision, the Board has resorted to rulemaking in only one substantive
area-the Board's jurisdiction over certain classes of employers. See A. Cox, et al., supra
note 10, at 159. And recently a committee of the NLRB Task Force dealing with
representation proceedings decided to reserve for future consideration the question of
"greater use of formal rulemaking by the Board." 94 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 66, 68 (Jan.
24, 1977).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
54. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
55. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
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noticed, or resented, by those affected by them if the changes are
buried in an adjudication rather than presented openly in a regula-
tion. Those who toil in the Board's vineyards are too sophisticated
for that.
That shifts in the substance of Board policy often follow shifts in
the Board's political complexion is well known. Indeed such shifts
may be desirable-so long as the policies remain within statutory
bounds-if the administration of federal labor law is to reflect in some
degree the prevailing political climate. It is far harder, I believe, to
accept the idea that such political factors in themselves may justify a
rule that purports to be based on assumptions that have been refuted
by an empirical study. And if there are good reasons why that idea
should not be accepted, there is no reason for the Board to shrink from
a rulemaking proceeding.
What would be the advantages of a rulemaking proceeding in con-
sidering whether any changes in the Board's election policies should
be made? A full answer would only rehearse points that are illustrated
in the Shopping Kart case and that several commentators have already
made.56 I simply note here that there would be considerable value in
subjecting a specific proposal to comment by all interested persons,
in allowing free discussion of the authors' data and conclusions and
their application to all relevant Board rules unimpeded by the con-
fines of a particular case, and in being able to consider submissions
without the restrictions of the rules of evidence applicable in a trial-
type adjudicatory hearing. 57 Furthermore, if the Board itself had its
own unit capable of assessing empirical data and of conducting re-
search, as a persuasive recent article has suggested, s such a unit could
make a valuable contribution to the rulemaking proceedings.
Whatever questions one may have about particular aspects of the
study, or about its broader significance for the NLRB and for all
policymaking agencies, it is too important to receive anything less than
the fullest and fairest consideration. Its fate may well influence the
extent to which scholars and their mentors will make commitments to
similar projects in the future.
56. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52; Peck, supra note 52; Shapiro, supra note 52.
57. Insofar as such submissions related to "legislative" rather than "adjudicative"
facts, they would presumably not be subject to all these restrictions, though the issues
in the case would still set the boundaries of relevance.
58. See Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 40. Interestingly, although the authors con-
cede that a rulemaking format would be more appropriate for the consideration of such
data, they conclude that "there is no reason to believe that the [proposed] unit's input
cannot be tailored to fit" the Board's preference for adjudication. Id. at 1463 n.89. I
disagree. Such submissions in the course of an adjudication are likely to distort the
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